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Abstract 
Polls have repeatedly shown a class based polarisation around Chávez, which 
some political science analysis on Venezuela has recognised. This paper seeks 
to show, however, that this class based division needs to be placed in historical 
context to be fully understood. Examining Venezuelan history from the colonial to 
the contemporary era the paper shows, unlike most previous work on Bolivarian 
Venezuela, that race is an important subtext to this class based support, and that 
there is indeed a correlation between class and race within the Venezuelan 
context. Furthermore, class and race are important positive elements in Chávez’s 
discourse, contrasting this with their negative use in opposition anti-Chavismo 
discourse. Finally the paper briefly reviews the Chávez government’s policy in 
tackling the class/race fissures in Venezuelan society, and concludes by asking 
whether these policies represent a change in the historical patterns of classism 
and racism within Venezuelan society or are simply reproducing past patterns.  
 
Key words: Venezuela, Chávez, Class, Race, Polarisation, anti-Chavismo, 
Neoliberalism.  
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Introduction 
President Chávez of Venezuela and the movement led by him has repeatedly 
triumphed at the ballot box since first being elected to the presidency in 1998. In 
the presidential elections of 2000, the revocatory referendum of 2004 and the 
latest presidential election in 2006, Chávez has maintained or increased his 
percentage of the vote. But who is voting for Chávez in Venezuela and why?  
In this article we find that Chávez’s support is primarily amongst the 
poorer sections of the Venezuelan people, the popular classes, and that in 
Venezuela, generally speaking, class interacts with race ‘in the production of 
inequalities’.1 This class/race interaction in Venezuela has deep roots in the 
country’s history, and the social fissures which stem from that fusion have been 
repeatedly glossed over by successive governments, aiming instead to create a 
myth of a united Venezuela, where class and race are elided from public 
discourse.2 Chávez, on the other hand, in his discourse and in his government’s 
policies, has repeatedly drawn attention to class differences in the country, by 
attacking the privileged classes and favouring the popular classes – el pueblo - 
while also drawing attention to race issues in a number of his pronouncements.  
This class/race fusion is an essential element needed to explain Chávez’s 
continuing popularity but most political analysis has paid little attention to the 
impact of race on Venezuelan politics.3 This paper aims to redress this by 
evaluating the role of race within wider based class divisions in the emergence of 
Chávez. Furthermore, and equally importantly, the paper seeks to show that 
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race, or rather racism is an essential but extremely subtle, ingredient in 
opposition discourse rejecting Chávez and those who follow him.  
The paper will examine these issues by firstly reviewing poll data on 
support for Chávez proving the class based nature of support for him. We will 
then go on to provide a theoretical exploration of the complex relationship 
between race and class, and illustrate this by examining class and race based 
prejudice in Venezuelan history. The paper will present both quantative data on 
ethnicity and refer to studies on media content in contemporary Venezuela, to 
illustrate the persistence and prevalence of racist discourse there. We will then 
go on to look at the role of class and race in the discourse of both Chávez and 
the opposition, showing how the latter uses it positively to engage with the 
poorer, darker skinned majority, while the opposition uses it negatively to 
provoke a negative reaction to Chávez and his supporters, mostly amongst the 
middle and upper classes. Furthermore, we will review positive policy measures 
looking to reverse these classist and racist historical trends implemented by the 
Chávez government and ask if this is a genuine attempt to break from this past, 
or whether it is simply the reproduction of behaviour from previous governments. 
In summary, it is argued in the paper that while class remains the defining fissure 
of current Venezuelan politics, race is its rarely examined subtext. 
  
Class based polarisation in Venezuela.  
Although historically class was elided from discourse in Venezuelan 
politics, support for President Hugo Chávez is largely polarised along class lines, 
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a fact that has been recognised by a number of political analysts. Using poll data 
from 1995 and 1998, Canache (2004) finds that it was the poor who mostly 
supported Chávez’s failed coup in 1992 against President Carlos Andrés Peréz, 
and in a survey in 1995 his support was strongest amongst the lower economic 
sectors.4  
In the 1998 presidential elections Roberts (2003) points to strong support 
amongst the poor for Chávez, whereas his chief rival Henrique Salas Römer's 
appeal was amongst the middle and upper sectors.5 Canache provides further 
evidence of this support, showing that in a pre-election survey conducted just 
before the 1998 presidential elections, 55% of the urban poor declared their 
intention to vote for Chávez, whereas only 45% of the non-poor expected to back 
him.6   
Similarly in the 2000 presidential elections one poll found that 50.5 per 
cent of socioeconomic sector E intended to vote for Chávez as opposed to 24 
per cent for Arias Cardenas, his principal opponent and co-conspirator in the 
1992 coup, while 66.7 per cent of socioeconomic groups A/B intended to vote for 
the latter.7 A poll published by Venezuelan polling firm Datanalisis in 2001, found 
a similar tendency.8  
Canache, however, predicts that the urban poor of Venezuela would 
become disillusioned with Chávez and cites poll data to prove this at the 
conclusion of her study. Nonetheless, poll data posterior to publication of that 
study reinforces rather than negates the tendency of support for Chávez amongst 
the poor. In a poll by Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner in 2004, shortly before the 
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revocatory referendum held on President Chávez’s mandate, 80 per cent of 
those polled in the A/B/C+ social category intended to vote for his removal from 
office (Sí) while close to 60 per cent of those in the E social category would vote 
against (No). Canache bases her prediction on Chávez’s failure to deliver 
promises made to the poor yet when asked for reasons in this poll why they 
chose to vote in favour of Chávez, 62 per cent said they believed that Chávez 
helped the poor and almost 60 per cent evaluated the government’s misiones or 
social programmes (see below) favourably, reinforcing the link between Chávez 
and the lower class in popular opinion.9  
More recently still, similar data was found in an Evans/Mc Donough 
Company Inc./Consultores 30.11 poll published on November, 29, 2006 just over 
a week before the December, 6 presidential elections of that year. 10  In this poll 
76 per cent of social stratum A/B and 47 per cent of stratum C said they would 
vote for Manuel Rosales, Governor of Zulia province and Chávez’s main rival, 
while 64 per cent of stratum D and 68 per cent of stratum E intended to vote for 
Chávez.  These two stratums made up the majority of respondents, representing 
jointly 62 per cent of the total. In the event Chávez won that election by 62 per 
cent, while the turnout was 75 per cent of registered voters. Chávez’s support 
amongst the poor has therefore remained relatively consistent over the eight 
years since he was first elected in 1998.  
 
Table 1 Here 
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Chávez's rise therefore signifies ‘a repoliticisation of social inequality in 
Venezuela’ with mostly the popular sectors identifying with Chávez and the 
middle and upper sectors with opponents of the president.11 The main argument 
in this paper, however, is that there is a racial subtext to this support. On the one 
hand the poor’s support for Chávez is based on the fact that he is like them: from 
a poor background and pardo (of mixed Indigenous, African and European 
descent). The figures presented in Tables 2 and 3 below would seem to support 
this suggestion. Conversely, the rejection of Chávez by parts of the middle and 
most of the upper classes in Venezuela is precisely due to a rejection of these 
very qualities: being poor and dark-skinned. This rejection is furthermore based 
on a deeply-rooted historical rejection of the Black as being culturally and socially 
inferior to the White. Despite, as Wright (1990)12 points out, the ‘seamier sides of 
racism’ being eradicated during the pre-Chávez period (1958-1993), the so-
called puntofijo13 era, this association of the Black with backwardness remains 
strong in Venezuela, especially in terms of media depictions of the poor. Dark 
skin, as we shall see, is still associated with poverty, and the darker the skin the 
more likely that that person will belong to the poorer sections of society. Thus 
race and class remain associated in Venezuela despite advancement in 
eradicating some elements of racism.  
In order to prove this let us first examine the substantive point of this 
article, that class divisions in Venezuelan politics have an element of ethnic and 
race division within it, before going on to examine more closely the association of 
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race and class in Chávez’s discourse and policy, as well as looking at classist 
and racist elements in opposition anti-Chávez discourse.  
 
Race/class interaction 
Despite views to the contrary, racism still exists and operates in Venezuela and 
this racism has deep roots in the country’s colonial past. Furthermore, in 
Venezuela as in much of the rest of Latin America, concepts of race and class 
fuse whereby generally speaking it is believed that the darker a person’s skin, the 
poorer that person will be.  
 Before looking at the concepts of race and class in the context of 
Venezuelan history, we first of all need to look at the relationship between these 
two concepts in sociological theory to provide a theoretical background to this 
contextual discussion. 
 Miles and Brown (2003) see the concept of ‘race’ and ‘races’ as ‘socially 
imagined rather than biological realities’. In a nutshell they see the phenomenon 
of race and racism as diverse but one that always centres on an ideology based 
on what they call a Self/Other dialectic. This ideology is two fold they argue. The 
act of racialisation of a given population, attributes the Other with negative 
attributes (‘autoracialisation’) while simultaneously and automatically giving the 
Self positive attributes. Hence, for example, European colonial discourse on 
Africans portrayed the African as ‘less civilised, a barbarian, by virtue of 
supposedly looking more like a beast and behaving in ways that approximated to 
the behaviour of a beast’.14 Conversely, the Self, the European was seen as 
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being the epitome of civilisation and human development. Conceptualisations 
such as these they argue seek ‘to claim the authority of a natural (and therefore 
unalterable) difference [and]…is the prelude to exclusionary practices’.15  
So what is the relationship, then between, the concept of race and that of 
class? The two are interlinked they argue because both perpetuate inequality. 
‘Racism is a denial of humanity (substituting, as it does, ‘races’ for ‘the human 
race’) and a means of legitimating inequality (particularly inequality explicit in 
class structures)’.16 How they interact, however, will depend on the class position 
of those practicing racism, because ‘Erlebnis (lived experienced of the world) and 
its consequent problems vary with class position’.17 Indeed the forms and 
expressions of racism have had ‘varying interaction with economic and political 
relations in capitalist and non-capitalist social formations’,18 hence any 
discussion of racism must therefore be ‘historically specific [as it is] knowable 
only as a result of historical analysis rather than abstract thinking’.19 
Consequently discussion on racism in Venezuela and its relationship to class 
must be looked at in an historical context to be properly understood, which is our 
task in the next few sections.  
  
Colonial and early republican contexts 
During the colonial era, Venezuela had small indigenous populations 
relative to the richer colonies of Peru and Mexico, so consequently it had to 
import labour through slavery from Africa, at considerable cost, both human and 
economic. In the period from the Conquest up until 1797, when the African slave 
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trade ended, 100,000 Africans entered Venezuela.20 These slaves were harshly 
treated both physically and socially and the black and the indigenous would 
remain stigmatized within Venezuelan society from thence on.  
Venezuela nonetheless became one of the more racially mixed colonies of 
Spanish America, as a process of miscegenation began there from the earliest 
times of the colony. By the end of the colonial era 60 per cent of Venezuelans 
had African origins and of the 25 per cent classified as white probably some 90 
per cent had some African ancestry.21 This would have repercussions for the 
country’s view of itself in later years, and of its inhabitants of themselves, as we 
shall see. 
Gott (2006) sees this era in Latin America in terms of a ‘white settler’ 
society paradigm. Seeking to “eliminate the indigenous population’, either 
physically or through policies of assimilation,22 white settlers in Latin America set 
out to achieve this by ‘simultaneously oppressing two different groups within their 
territory: they seized the land of the indigenous peoples, and they appropriated 
the labour of the black slaves that they had imported’.23   
Republican Venezuela retained or assumed the characteristics of 
colonialism, resulting in the Latin American white settler elite having a 
Eurocentric approach to society and nation building, and a deep mistrust of 
native and African conceptions of community and society. 24  In consequence the 
white settler elites of Latin America had more in common with the elites of 
Europe and North America than their fellow Latin Americans, leading to an 
‘ingrained racist fear and hatred of the white settlers, alarmed by the continuing 
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presence of the expropriated underclass…’25 Struggles between rich and poor in 
Latin America therefore not only were class based but also race based, a fact, 
Gott notes, that ‘even politicians and historians of the Left’ have ignored 
preferring to ‘discuss class rather than race’.26 Venezuela was no exception 
within this pattern, although it has had distinct overtones due to its individual 
historical trajectory as we shall see.  
 
Miscegenation in modern Venezuela 
This rejection of the black and the indigenous continued into the twentieth 
century through the ‘ideology of mestizaje (miscegenation), also known as the 
myth of democracy or racial equality, [which] served to mask racial discrimination 
and the socioeconomic situation of the Afro-Venezuelan and indigenous 
communities’.27  In this ideology the white European was identified as ‘the 
civilizing agent, making Africans and the indigenous and their descendants 
largely invisible’.28 This ideology also ‘denied the existence of social classes’, 
and instead looked to a cultural homogenization, spread primarily through the 
educational system.29 This policy of mestizaje and the denial of racism within 
Venezuela continued into the liberal democratic puntofijo regime, installed 
definitively in 1958.  
The puntofijo regime was designed to avoid conflict and antagonism, 
encourage conciliation and negate the polarisation of Venezuelan society along 
class and, following the logic of our argument, racial lines. Access to the vote, to 
education and to health services and an expanding middle class temporarily 
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ameliorated the worst excesses of class/race divisions of Venezuela, forging 
even further the myth of a classless, non-racist, united Venezuela. Yet as time 
went by, the economic model began to be exhausted under the weight of a slump 
in oil prices and increased external borrowing. 
From Black Friday in February 1983, when the government of Luis 
Herrera Campins dramatically devalued the bolívar in the face of a slump in oil 
prices and massive capital flight, the regime began to crumble. On the economic 
level, for example, Venezuelans saw their standard of living plummet.  Between 
1990 and 1997, according to the UN, per capita income fell from US$5192 to 
US$2858, and Venezuela's human development index from 0.8210 to 0.7046.30  
With this economic crisis the vision of a united, non-racial and classless 
Venezuela lost its mythical power. Racist discourse began to re-emerge amongst 
the upper and middle classes. The link between class and race became more 
explicit as Afro-Venezuelan and indigenous people became the scapegoats for 
Venezuela’s economic failure. Ishibashi (2003) shows how stereotypes of 
fecklessness and indolence of Afro-Venezuelans were perpetuated through the 
Venezuelan media. As Ishibashi puts it: ‘The “white” is normally the symbol of the 
beautiful, the rich, the pure and the sophisticated, while the ‘black’ is the symbol 
of the ugly, the poor, the impure and the non-sophisticated’.31 Black people in the 
Venezuelan media, in advertisements, TV soaps, cinema and in beauty 
pageants, are practically ‘invisible’. When they are seen, they are often 
associated with partying on the beach, reinforcing the idea of the black as being 
‘feckless’, or in a position of providing a service of physical labour.  
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Class plays a role in the depiction of blacks in the Venezuelan media, with 
products directed at the upper classes usually being advertised by white models, 
while those directed at the popular classes usually using darker skinned models. 
As one media photographer admits: ‘the darker the [skin] colour, the more 
[models] are associated with the lowest social classes’.32 Indeed not only is 
‘colour associated with [social] classes’ but Afro-Venezuelans are also, as we 
have seen, associated with the ‘ugly’.33 This reinforces the association in the 
popular mind of the ‘west’ or the ‘white’ being associated with the ‘superior and 
civilized’ while the rest are ‘inferior and savage’.  
It is of no surprise then that in surveys done on ethnicity within Venezuela, 
those who identify as ‘Afro-Venezuelan’ are in a small minority, of much lesser 
significance to those who identify as white. For example in the World Values 
Survey (2007) in Venezuela, 4.2% of respondents identified themselves as 
Black-Other/Black, whereas 35.8% identified themselves as White/Caucasian 
White. Nevertheless, the survey also provides a number of intermediate options, 
such as ‘Coloured-Dark’ (16.6%) and ‘Coloured-Light’ (42.7%). Indigenous 
groups on the other hand represent only 0.5% of the population, but despite their 
small numbers have important symbolic value.34  
Apart from the highly subjective nature of such categories (what is the 
actual physical difference between Black and ‘Coloured-Dark’?), not to mention 
the high probability that those who identify themselves as ‘Caucasian-White’ 
have some element of Black or Indian blood (as noted by Ewell, 1984 above), the 
important point to note is that the majority of Venezuelans, approximately 64%, 
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identify themselves as non-white. It is important also to point out that in a social 
context where the Black is highly undervalued, if not despised, the probability of 
Venezuelans not identifying themselves with that ethnic category is most likely 
increased.   
While at the time of writing it appears that no figures exist providing a 
breakdown of the racial make-up of each social class in Venezuela, it is 
instructive to compare social class breakdown with that of racial categories. As 
we can see in Figures 2 and 3, if we compare the total of social sectors A+B+C, 
at 40% with the total of those who identified themselves as White, at 35.8% we 
find a strong similarity in the percentages found pertaining to both those 
categories. Similarly if we compare the total of sectors D+E, the poorest social 
sectors, at 60%, with the total of those who identified as non-white (i.e. black, 
coloured dark, coloured light and indigenous) at 64.2%, again we find a high level 
of correlation between both sets of figures. This suggests, although by no means 
definitively, that there is a strong level of probability that those who identify as 
white are found in the higher social sectors while those who identify as black, 
mixed raced or indigenous are found in the D or E social categories. If we then 
go on further to look at the figures in Table 1 above, showing voting patterns in 
favour of President Chávez we find similar correlations between percentages in 
all three sets of figures. In other words, there is a high probability, judging by 
these figures, that a poorer Venezuelan, with darker skin, will vote for Chávez 
(see above).    
Table 2 here 
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Table 3 here 
These figures suggest furthermore, that, as Herrera Salas (2003) 
emphasises, racism is not just a social phenomenon in Venezuela but has a 
political economy rationale also. This is reinforced by the dependent situation of 
Venezuela’s economy. In Venezuela structured employment, wealth, taxation 
and the distribution of social goods are subject to influence by the structural 
factors of race/class and the economic relations with the core capitalist countries. 
Economic dependence preserves underdevelopment, perpetuating the existing 
class/race bifurcation and the inequalities stemming from these basic societal 
cleavage, which in turn itself further perpetuates economic dependence.  
Both these factors have resulted in a stratified society based on race, with 
non-white majorities having limited access to the scant formal employment 
opportunities available.  The white or 'near-white' elite on the other hand acts as 
the mediator between local markets and capitalist centres, with local capitalists 
playing a reduced role in the local market, providing basic consumer goods (such 
as beer, wine, flour etc.) to it but few high value manufactured products.   
These economic and cultural tendencies led the country to a deepening 
political polarisation which, as we shall see in the next section, became most 
apparent during the second presidency of Carlos Andrés Peréz (1989-93) as he 
attempted to introduce a neoliberal restructuring programme into Venezuela. 
 
The rise of neoliberalism and the death of a united Venezuela  
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The introduction of neoliberal policies by Peréz sparked off the greatest 
public disorders seen in modern Venezuelan history, which came to be known as 
the Caracazo (27 - 28 February, 1989).  Peréz brought in a number of 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) sponsored economic measures including the 
raising of fuel costs with a concomitant rise in public transport charges. This 
provoked residents of Caracas's overcrowded shantytowns, and those in many 
other Venezuelan cities, to come down from the cerros (hills) and proceed to loot 
shops and warehouses, initially for food, but as the disturbances developed for 
all sorts of consumer goods. Government reaction was initially tame but 
eventually President Pérez called a state of emergency and left it to the Army 
and Police to quell the disturbances. The result was the use of ‘massive violence’ 
and an official death toll of 277, an unofficial one running into the thousands.35  
Establishment presentations of the Caracazo unearthed once again the 
barely latent classism and racism buried under the official myth of a classless 
and non-racial Venezuela. To those in power the caracazo represented the 
eruption of barbarism, of primitivism pitted against civilisation. The 'pueblo' 
(people) were a source of barbarism, the government and the elite a force for 
reason and civilisation; ‘[t]he nation was split in two’.36 After the caracazo, 
Venezuela would not be the same again as protest became the norm, increasing 
both in incidence, violence and variety and extending to almost all sectors of 
society.37  It symbolised the eruption of the class factor once again into the 
national political arena and following the logic of our argument, also the question 
of race.  
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Despite President Peréz admitting the class nature of the disturbances 
and the economic measures which sparked them off, 38 he persisted in their 
implementation, leading initially to some macroeconomic success. By 1992, 
however, unemployment, informalisation of employment and poverty had all 
increased.39 Meanwhile as the Venezuelan population in general and the popular 
classes in particular paid the price of economic reform, the governmental and 
business elites were seen to enrich themselves even further through financial 
speculation and/or corruption. Dissatisfaction grew and in 1992 Peréz's 
government was rocked by two unsuccessful coups, the first led by Lt. Col. Hugo 
Chávez on February 4. While the coups failed, by 1993 Peréz was impeached 
and under house arrest for corruption, finally going into exile, where he still 
remains.  
This cleared the way for the emergence of Chávez as a political force in 
the country and as we have seen in the first part of this paper this support came 
mostly from the poor of Venezuela. Yet as we have sought to prove, the vast 
majority of those poor are the darker skinned, black or pardo citizens of 
Venezuela. The next section will seek to answer the following question therefore: 
Why do the poorer, darker-skinned majorities of Venezuela vote for Chávez? 
Two reasons are offered for this: firstly, in his discourse Chávez has exalted the 
nobility of the ordinary Venezuelan in his discourse, and that ordinary 
Venezuelan is poor and of mixed-race extraction, like himself. Secondly, the 
Chávez government has directed policy towards improving the social and 
economic situation of the poor, pardo Venezuelan. This contrasts greatly with 
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opposition discourse and policy which has subtle, and sometimes not so subtle, 
racist and classist elements causing distrust amongst most poor Venezuelans.  
 
Chávez’s discourse on class and race.  
 
The ‘People’: race and class in chavismo 
The movement launched by Chávez adopted as its ideology a system of thinking 
specifically Venezuelan and Latin American, bolivarianismo, rather than one 
based on imported ideologies. Bolivarianismo is based on the thinking and 
teachings of three major figures from Venezuelan history:  Ezequiel Zamora, 
popular military leader in the Federal Wars; Símon Rodríguez, educator, friend 
and mentor to the final member of the trinity, the Liberator, Símon Bolívar.  Each 
figure provides a specific element to the new ideology: Zamora the element of 
rebellion, popular protest and protagonism, summed up in the slogan attributed 
to him: ‘Land and free men! Popular elections! Horror to the oligarchy!’; 
Rodríguez the requirement for autochthonous ideological originality when he 
warned that ‘either we invent or we commit errors (…) America should not 
servilely imitate, but be original’; and Bolívar, the Liberator, the symbol of 
equilibrium between the dualism of  rebellion and ideology, force and consent.40   
Central and crucial to this ideology is the concept of 'el pueblo', the 
people.  For Laclau (2005), the people are not so much a coalition of identities, 
as portrayed by many analysts of populism, but rather invest their diverse 
identities into one privileged identity.  For Laclau, this identity is the 
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underprivileged, the plebs, who function as representative of the whole people, 
the populus. In other words the totality is expressed through a singularity and the 
extreme form of a singularity is an individuality. The group then, the totality of the 
populus, becomes symbolically unified around an individuality, in this case the 
leader. The ‘leader’ therefore ‘is inherent in the formation of a people’41, indeed 
comes to signify the people themselves, or rather what the people strive for.  
This process can be seen in the relationship between Chávez and the 
‘people’ in Venezuela. Chávez reifies the people in his discourse. For him, 
‘popular protagonism [is] the fuel of history’ and only when this protagonism 
exists is a people truly el pueblo.42  Leadership must be provided in order to 
galvanise the collective into action, but the leader is but a conduit.  The people 
are an ‘unleashed force, equal to the rivers’ being channelled by leaders such as 
Chávez because either ‘we provide a course for that force, or that force will pass 
over us’.43  Chávez is ‘not a cause, but a consequence’,44 ‘an instrument of the 
collective’.45
 Race and class are central sources of identification for Chávez with the 
concept of el pueblo. Chávez repeatedly emphasizes his background as a pardo 
and as a common man. Kozloff (2005) quotes Chávez as saying: ‘My Indian 
roots are from my father's side […] He [my father] is mixed Indian and black, 
which makes me very proud.’ He also boasted, according to Kozloff, that his 
grandmother was a Pumé Indian. Kozloff goes on to report that apart from being 
pardo, ‘Chávez was [also] born in extremely humbling conditions in the llano, 
[Orinoco plains area of Central Venezuela]: ‘”I was a farm kid from the plains of 
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South Venezuela,” he remarked to Ted Koppel ‘on ABC's Nightline. “I grew up in 
a palm tree house with an earthen floor,” he added’.46   Chávez frequently refers 
to cultural symbols associated with grassroots Venezuelan communities: the 
arepa, a corn bread that is part of the staple diet for ordinary Venezuelans, 
baseball, the national sport, and occasionally breaks out into a typical 
Venezuelan song in the middle of a speech, which is often laden with 
colloquialisms.  
 On another occasion, Chávez points out the links between racism in the 
United States and the underlying racism in discourse against Chávez himself:  
 
“Racism is very characteristic of imperialism. Racism is very characteristic of 
capitalism….Hate against me has a lot to do with racism. Because of my big mouth, 
because of my curly hair. And I’m so proud to have this mouth and this hair, because it is 
African.” 
 
In the end, Chávez insists it is socialism ‘a new ethic’ which is needed “to beat 
those ominous phenomenon such as racism”.47
Through discourse celebrating the common man and his ethnic 
background, Chávez is underlining his similarities with the majority of 
Venezuelans. As we have seen most Venezuelans are black or mixed race, with 
some indigneous (64 per cent) and most are in the lower socio-economic 
brackets (62% in stratums D and E). It is no accident therefore that in the last 
presidential elections in 2006, similar percentages of the population voted for 
Chávez (62% out of a turnout of 75%).  
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 Opposition discourse on class and race 
The Chávez discourse celebrating race and class, contrasts greatly with 
that emanating from opposition elements. Some of this discourse presents 
deeply subtle forms of racism and classism, whereas others are much more 
radical. In it the image is projected of a pueblo being easily manipulated and 
incapable of thinking rationally. Pedro Carmona Estanga, for example, leader of 
peak business organisation, FEDECAMARAS and erstwhile president for 48 
hours during the coup against Chávez in April, 2002, wrote in an article published 
shortly before the 1998 Presidential elections that ‘people don't understand the 
Constituyente but simply emotionally follow the candidate that is promoting it’. 
Francia gives further examples of this, where the vote for Chávez is considered 
an 'emotional' vote, while votes against him are considered 'rational'.48 Similarly 
Julio Borges, leader of US funded political party Primero Justicia (Justice First), 
qualifies those who vote for Chávez as 'inhabitants' not 'citizens', implying that 
they acted without thinking.49 On field work to Venezuela in 2002, I found that 
some people rejected Chávez because, according to them, Venezuela needed 
‘gente preparada’, educated, trained people, this despite the fact that Chávez 
has a BSc in military science and studied for a Masters in Political Science.   
Less subtle forms of racism and classism are also found in opposition 
discourse on Chávez supporters. In March, 2004, during a high-level 
international summit in Caracas, opposition television station Globovisión 
parodied President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe as a monkey, prompting six 
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African countries to object.50 Herrera Salas points to a visceral racism and 
classism directed towards the president and his supporters by opposition 
members and media, where the President is routinely referred to as ‘Indian, 
monkey and thick-lipped’ or simply as a ‘monkey’.51 Supporters of Chávez are 
regularly referred to as ‘hordes’ and the pro-government Bolivarian Circles as 
‘terror circles’.  Duno (2004) examines how media portrayals of Chávez 
supporters suggest this image of the mob as one “swayed by its leader, or 
moved by base emotions, failing to exercise its will in a rational fashion”.  Worse, 
the image is of ‘those people’ [who] go on marches because they are paid to or 
because it gives them a chance to get drunk”. 52 These portrayals of Chávez 
supporters have underlying them a profound racial and classist bias.  
Duno shows us through recounting several examples of media racism 
against Chávez supporters, that it is indeed the construction of a “national 
political imaginary…articulated on the basis of racist thought”.53 In the end, the 
main thrust of these disqualifying media presentations of Chávez supporters, 
Duno asserts, are “a strategy to remove political legitimacy from marginalised 
social subjects”54 who are in effect political actors who have challenged power.55  
Furthermore, as Wilpert (2007) asserts, this is a strategy on the part of the old 
established elite, removed from power by Chávez, to attempt to regain that 
power. The old elite uses “its control of the country’s mass media to turn the 
middle class against Chávez, creating a campaign that took advantage of the 
latent racism and classism in Venezuelan culture”.56  
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Some opposition analysts, while recognising this racism and classism 
within the opposition ranks, blame Chávez for this situation. For Patricia Marquez 
for example, of the elite Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administración 
(IESA) it is Chávez who has ‘stirred up the beehive of social harmony’.57 Yet, 
Herrera Salas counters, it ‘is evident…that [Chávez’s] political discourse and the 
symbolic and cultural practices of the Bolivarian Revolution have emphasised so-
called national values, significantly reducing the occurrence of ethnic shame and 
endoracism in the popular sectors’.58 This chavista discourse has been 
translated into numerous policy initiatives which have further recognised the 
existence of the class and race fractures in Venezuelan society, as we shall see 
in the next section.  
 
Bolivarian race and class policy 
In general indigenous and Afro-Venezuelans as well as the majority pardo 
population can take advantage of the various missions set up by the Chávez 
government to ensure greater access for the popular classes in a variety of social 
areas. Indigenous groups also have their own, specific misiones. Mujica and 
Rincón group these into the following areas: 1) Education; 2) Health; 3) Food and 
Salaries; 4) Employment; 5) Land; 6) Indigenous and 7) Identity. 59  Under 
Education there are a number of missions: Mission Robinson I covering basic 
literacy and II covering the completion of primary education. Mission Ribas 
covers secondary education and Sucre third level, both of these providing 
monthly scholarships of $100 for each student.  
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Under Health there is the most important Mission ‘Into the Neighbourhood’ 
(Barrio Adentro) which establishes health clinics in shanty towns covered by 
Cuban medical personnel. There are also the Miracle Mission (Mision Milagro) 
providing eye operations for children in Cuban hospitals and Sports Mission 
(Mision Deporte) promoting sport in marginalised areas. Under food and salaries 
there is Mercal Mission, which provides low cost food stuffs through a state run 
store network as well as the Maximum Protection Programme providing half price 
basic food stuffs and comedores populares or Soup Kitchens providing low cost 
meals.  
In employment, Mission Turn Heads (Mision Vuelvan Caras) builds on the 
work of the educational missions by helping their graduates find work and Piar 
Mission which helps mining communities. On Land, Mission Zamora, associated 
with the Land Law, works on land distribution to poor families as well as providing 
credit, technical assistance, training and infrastructure. Mission Guaicapuro 
promotes the intergral development of indigenous communities ensuring that 
their Constitutional rights are delivered. Finally, the Housing Mission seeks to 
guarantee the right to housing and the Identity Mission to ensure that everyone 
obtains legal identity documents.  
In general, it is estimated that of the $40.5 billion dollar 2006 budget, 41 
per cent was dedicated to social programmes and that social spending has 
increased three fold since Chávez came to office in 1998.60 Much of that social 
spending went on the various misiones explained above.  
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The Chávez government has also attempted to tackle disadvantage based 
on race, for the indigenous at least. Indigenous people are guaranteed through 
Article 121 of the Bolivarian Constitution, the right to maintain their cultural 
identity, the state’s promotion of that right, and the right to education for in a 
culturally appropriate manner. There are reserved seats in the National Assembly 
for Indigenous people and some indigenous have occupied high-level posts such 
as Noelí Pocaterra, who became vice-president of the National Assembly. The 
Organic Law for Indigenous Peoples and Communities (LOPCI in its Spanish 
acronym), passed in 2006, set up the National Institute of Indigenous Peoples 
(INPI) run by the indigenous and charged with establishing the procedures for the 
demarcation of Indigenous Lands and Habitats. Other laws passed include the 
creation of a Vice Ministry for Indigenous Affairs, new health care initiatives and 
the extension of the Mision Guaicapuro in education. 
There is, however, no corresponding recognition of Afro-Venezuelans in 
the Constitution and as a result no pro-Afro Venezuelan legislation, despite 
representations from Afro-Venezuelan groups. In a package of proposed 
amendments to the Constitution formulated in August 2007, however, such 
recognition was finally proposed. This package was rejected by the Venezuelan 
people in a referendum in December of that year, largely due to controversial 
proposals to extend Presidential powers.  
Nonetheless, we can see from this brief summary that Chávez himself has 
prioritized class and race issues in discourse and many policy initiatives have 
tackled classism directly, with race issues being subsumed within these more 
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general programmes, except in the case of the indigenous. The question 
remains, however, to what extent this represents a genuine change in the 
structure of Venezuelan society. We turn to this question in the next section.  
 
Class and Race in Venezuela: A break with the past or the song remains 
the same?  
Despite the advances outlined above there are a number of problems in their 
design and delivery, as well as due to the historical context, which have limited 
the impact of change for the popular classes, in their majority pardo, Afro-
Venezuelan and indigenous peoples of Venezuela. 
 Of all the initiatives aimed at eliminating disadvantage along class lines 
the Missions have been most successful. The combined effect of the Missions 
and other social programmes have resulted in a drop in poverty from 44 per cent 
of households in 1998 to 31 per cent in 2006. This, as Weisbrot et al. (2006) 
point out only covers cash income – the combined effects of the above 
mentioned missions, most of which are not cash based, may have further 
reduced poverty in Venezuela. For example, the Venezuelan government has 
provided free health care to an estimated 54 per cent of the population and well 
as subsidized food for 40 per cent.61  Furthermore, the management of these 
missions provides much popular participation, through a variety of novel 
mechanisms such as local health committees (comités de salud) or local 
communal councils (consejos comunales) to develop and manage local affairs at 
neighbourhood level.  
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The independent Venezuelan human rights organisation, PROVEA in their 
annual evaluation of human rights for 2004-2005, hails the advances towards 
social justice and equality during Chávez’s years in power. These improvements 
have been particularly felt, they note, amongst the poorest sections of society, 
with an important increase in income for socio-economic stratum E, the group, as 
we have seen which provides the bedrock of popular support for the Chávez 
government. PROVEA sees these tendencies as a democratizing force, 
increasing equality and social justice.62  
In the following year’s report (2005-2006) they recommend, however, 
improvements in five key areas in order to ensure lasting structural changes in 
favour of all, but particularly the traditionally excluded.63 These are: 
1. Integrating Missions into the existing institutionality and putting 
them under more rigorous cost and evaluation controls.  
2. Creating a real division of powers between institutions, reducing the 
protagonism of the presidency, and reversing the tendency towards 
the militarization of Venezuelan society.  
3. Fostering an appropriate climate to handle conflict and reach 
consensus through the creation of more space for dialogue.  
4. Providing a National Plan for Human Rights with ample popular 
participation.  
5. Ensuring the participation of the population in public affairs, 
guaranteeing citizenship and the autonomy of social organizations.  
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‘Who governs in the next six years’ PROVEA concludes, ‘have the 
challenge to construct a democracy with social justice, solid and efficient 
institutions, less poor people, with citizens more conscious of their rights, and 
with a significant decline in human rights abuses and impunity, as well as 
creating adequate conditions for the exercising and enjoyment of all human rights 
without discrimination’.64
While the Chávez government has advanced notably towards a number of 
these goals since coming to power in 1999, and whilst discursively in particular it 
has clearly voiced its wish to aim towards many of them, in practice it still has 
quite some way to go. The most recent 2006-2007 PROVEA survey notes that 
Venezuela is in a state of transition between the old puntofijo republic and a new 
form of state aiming towards a ‘socialism of the XXI century’. Within Venezuelan 
society there is a battle, within and without the government, between those 
whose actions are characterised by authoritarianism and those aiming towards a 
full participative democracy.65 It remains to be seen if in the remaining five years 
of Chávez’s second full mandate whether he will aim towards the latter with the 
necessary vigour to ensure popular participation for all, especially those 
traditionally excluded on the basis of class and race, and thus truly reverse the 
historical patterns which helped create the space for him to emerge as a leader 
in the first place.  
 
Conclusion 
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To conclude, our survey shows that the bulk of Chávez’s support emerges 
from the poorer, darker skinned sectors of Venezuelan society. This has two 
implications: firstly that there a polarization around class in Venezuela, with a 
powerful racial subtext which points to the emergence of a class-based political 
system for the present at least.  Secondly, in terms of the study of Venezuelan 
politics and Chávez’s support in particular, that there is a complex interrelation 
between class and race in this area. However this has only been a tentative 
exploration to highlight this fact and if anything the issue needs more detailed 
research to draw out its full implications.  
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Table 1: Class/Race polarisation in Venezuela – Poll Data 2000-2006 
YEAR/SOCIAL 
CLASS 
A B C D E % IN 
ELECTION 
% social class in 
overall pop 
5% 35% 39% 21% 100% 
2000 66.7% 
(Opp) 
N/A N/A 50.5% 
(Ch) 
59.76% (Ch) 
37.52% 
(Opp) 
2004 80% 
(Sí)* 
15% 
(No)* 
 
61% (Sí) 
34%(No) 
51% (Sí) 
43%(No) 
38% (Sí) 
59%(No) 
40.63% (S i) 
59.9% (No) 
2006 76% 
(Opp) 
17% 
(Ch) 
47% 
(Opp) 
48% (Ch)
32% 
(Opp) 
64% (Ch)
26% 
(Opp) 
68% (Ch) 
38.39% 
(Opp) 
62% (Ch) 
 
Table own elaboration. Sources: Subero, C. 2000; Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner, 2004; Evans 
Mc Donagh/Consultores 30.11, 2006; Consejo Nacional Electoral, 2007.  
* Sí refers to the option in favour of removing Chávez, No to the option against. 
Key:  
Opp=Main Opposition Candidates: Francisco Arias Cardenas (2000), Manuel Rosales 
(2006). 
Ch=Hugo Chávez Frías, President of Venezuela.   
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Table 2: Social class sectors population breakdown: Venezuela 
SOCIAL CLASS A+B C D E Total 
% social class in overall pop 5% 35% 39% 21% 100% 
Total A+B+C and D+E 40% 60% 100% 
 
Table own elaboration. Source: Greenberg, Quinlan and Rosner, 2004 p.24. Note: (A,B, C+). 
Social strata vary from poll to poll but generally those in A,B and upper C are regarded as in high 
income brackets; C- in the middle income bracket and D and E in the low income bracket, the 
poorest income strata.  
 
Table 3: Racial category breakdown: Venezuela 
RACIAL 
CATEGORY 
White Coloured 
Light 
Coloured 
Dark 
Black Indigenous Total 
% race in 
overall pop 
35.8% 42.7% 16.6% 4.2% 0.5% 100%
Totals 
White/Non-
white 
35.8% 64.2% 100%
 
Table own elaboration. Source: World Values Survey, Venezuela, 1996 & 2000. Categories were 
self-selected by respondents from presented options.  
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